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Seeking a Response-able God: 
The Wesleyan Tradition
 and Process Theology
Randy L. Maddox
While its roots run back into the nineteenth century, process theology found its distinct
identity and garnered significant influence during the second half of the twentieth century. One
of the notable characteristics of this formative generation is the high percentage of advocates
drawn from a Wesleyan background, including such major voices as Schubert Ogden, John B.
Cobb Jr., Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, and David Pailin.1
This prominence might appear to be accidental. There is little concern about Wesleyan
precedents for process convictions reflected in any of their programmatic works. But this pattern
must be put in context. Through a variety of influences Wesley had been widely dismissed as a
theological mentor among his ecclesiastical descendants by the beginning of the twentieth
century. This dismissal has been significantly reversed only in the last couple of decades, as
theologians in the broad Wesleyan tradition have begun to reconsider both his model of
theological activity and his central theological convictions.2 One result is that some of the
process theologians noted above have recently reflected on the possible congruence of their
distinctive commitments with their Wesleyan roots.3
Wesleyan Theology for Today (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1995). [Note: Ogden and Suchocki are
reprinted in this volume].
4See Cobb & Griffin, Process Theology, 8–9, 41.
5For a survey of the range of his doctrinal concern, see Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace:
John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1994).
6While his early sermons focus on soteriology, themes about the divine nature become common
later; e.g., Sermon 54, “On Eternity,” Works 2:358–72; Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” Works
2:535–50; Sermon 68, “The Wisdom of the Divine Counsels,” Works 2:552–66; Sermon 118, “On the
Omnipresence of God,” Works 4:40–47; and Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” Works
4:61–71.
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These Wesleyan process theologians have consistently identified the most relevant
congruence to lie in convictions about the nature of God and of God’s interaction with humanity.
This is significant because these issues are central to the emphases of process theology. As one
standard introduction frames it, the defining goal of process theology has been to articulate a
compelling model of God as Creative-Responsive Love, as a preferable alternative to such
longstanding models as Cosmic Moralist, Unchanging and Passionless Absolute, Controlling
Power, and the like.4 The purpose of this essay is to trace an analogous theological project
running through the Wesleyan tradition, as one way to explain the number of formative
advocates of process theology nurtured in this tradition.
Wesley’s Theological Advocacy of a Response-able God
While Wesley’s theological concern had a soteriological focus, this did not restrict its
doctrinal sweep. Through the course of his ministry he came to recognize the formative impact
of a broadening range of Christian teaching.5 One area that drew more attention over the years
was the various aspects of the doctrine of God.6 Wesley grew increasingly sensitive to how
differences in this area were integral to some of the issues that he faced among his people. A
good example is the debate over predestination. Wesley became convinced that it was not
primarily a disagreement over how much freedom humans possess, or over how to interpret
particular verses of Scripture. It was instead—at its core—a disagreement over the nature of
God.
7“Address to the Calvinists,” stanza 3, Arminian Magazine 3 (1778): 383–84.
8Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §28, Works 3:557.
9Note John’s claim that wise persons are those who recognizes God as their Father, their friend,
and the parent of all good (Sermon 33, “Sermon on the Mount XIII,” §II.2, Works 1:692); and his
suggestion of how to explain God to a child (Sermon 94, “On Family Religion,” §III.7, Works 3:341).
10See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 19.
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As in many other cases, Wesley’s deepest concern about the Calvinist affirmation of
unconditional election/reprobation was articulated strikingly in verse by his brother Charles
(which John endorsed by publication in the Arminian Magazine):
  ’Tis thus, O God, they picture Thee,
Thy Justice and Sincerity;
Thy Truth which never can remove,
Thy bowels of unbounded Love: 
Thy freedom of Redeeming Grace,
‘With-held from almost all the Race,
Made for Apollyon to devour,
In honour of thy Sovereign Power!’7
Note that the objection offered here is to the way that the Calvinists “picture” God. In their
predestinarian opponents the Wesley brothers saw a defining model of a sovereign monarch (in
the heat of controversy John put it less graciously: an omnipresent almighty tyrant!8). By
contrast, their more characteristic model of God was that of a loving parent.9
This difference in fundamental models or analogies for God was reflected in assumptions
about divine/human interaction in salvation. In contrast with the Calvinist emphasis on
protecting God’s sovereign freedom in all interaction with humanity, Wesley was concerned
throughout his ministry with articulating what I have termed a model of “responsible grace.”10
He strove to preserve the vital tension between two biblical truths that he viewed as co-definitive
of Christianity: without God’s grace, we cannot be saved; while without our (grace-empowered,
but uncoerced) participation, God’s grace will not save. The God whose prevenient gracious
empowerment makes us response-able is like a truly loving parent in also finally respecting the
integrity of our responsible appropriation of that grace.
11Cf. Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §§24–25, Works 3:552–56; and Predestination Calmly
Considered, esp. §§36–43, John Wesley, 441–45.
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 There are obviously strong implications of Wesley’s favored analogy of God and its
related emphasis on “responsible grace” for doctrines detailing the human dimensions of
salvation. The implications for doctrinal debates concerning the nature of God are no less strong.
Wesley’s increased engagement with standard topics in the doctrine of God in his later years
reflects some attempt to think through these implications, in dialogue with alternative stances
championed in his time. Implications for understanding God’s moral attributes emerged most
immediately—with Wesley stringently rejecting any conception of Divine justice and mercy, or
God’s universal love and goodness, that rendered these compatible with unconditional
reprobation.11 The point most relevant to our present concern is that he also became uneasy with
some conceptions of God’s natural attributes that were commonly defended in Protestant and
Roman Catholic scholastic theologies, sensing that these conceptions did not do justice to the
way that God actually relates to us in responsible grace. The general trajectory of his reaction to
these conceptions was to lay greater stress on the genuinely response-able nature of God.
Immutability and Response-ability
A good place to begin in getting a sense of this trajectory in Wesley’s thought is with the
Christian confession that God is immutable or unchanging. The biblical roots of this confession
primarily stress God’s faithfulness to covenant commitments. Over time further implications
were connected with the notion of immutability, partly through the influence of Platonic and
Aristotelian assumptions about perfection and change. It came to be broadly assumed that there
could be no type of change in God since change would either be for the worse, or (if for the
better) would indicate that God had not been as perfect previously as God could be. It was
emphasized in particular that  God could not “suffer” change—in the sense of being subjected to
undesired change by an external agent. Given that several emotions are “suffered” in precisely
this sense, many came to argue that the immutable God had no emotions, or at least no
“passions” as they called those emo-
12For a very thoughtful presentation of this case, see Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer?
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2000). A helpful articulation of the alternative is Paul S.
Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
13NT Notes, Luke 15:7.
14Serious Thoughts on the Perseverance of the Saints, §14, Works (Jackson) 10:289–90.
15He quotes this article in Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §8, Works 4:63.
16See NT Notes, Rom. 5:9; and A Letter to the Reverend Mr. Law (6 January 1756), §II.2, Letters
(Telford) 3:346.
17Cf. Sermon 45, “The New Birth,” §I.1, Works 2:188.
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tions that are suffered in response to things beyond our initiative and full control. Even those
who allowed that God had affections or emotions per se tended to argue that God experienced no
fluctuation or change of these in response to creaturely events. While God might timelessly
grieve over the loss of innocent victims, they urged that we should not think of God uniquely
grieving at the time of and in response to the loss of any particular innocent victim.
While conclusions like this might seem to run counter to Christian sensibilities, they have
been considered by many to be essential to protecting God’s perfection and sovereignty.12
Wesley was sensitive to these concerns, but he was also convinced that Scripture portrayed a
God who took individual interest in us. This conviction is hinted at in his argument that the
scriptural claim that God experiences joy at a person’s conversion is an appropriate
“representation.”13 It is more evident in his defense of the possibility of persons culpably falling
from grace, against the charge that this made God changeable. His basic argument was that a
God who did not take into account the changing response of humanity would cease to be
unchangeably just and gracious!14 A God of truly responsible grace must respond to each of us in
our unique situations.
This emphasis raises the question of whether Wesley shared the hesitance found in many
scholastic theologies to assign emotions to God. The evidence is a little mixed. He could affirm
Article I of his Anglican tradition which maintained that as a spirit the living God had no “body,
parts, or passions.”15 Yet he also defended the scriptural ascription of passions to God, as long as
this was understood analogically.16 Most importantly, he identified the affections as one of those
analogues of God’s being that we share as creatures graciously created in the Image of God.17
“Affections” was Wesley’s common term for those positive emotions that are the
18NT Notes, 1 John 4:8; and Predestination Calmly Considered, §43, John Wesley, 445.
19It appears that Wesley left the phrase in when editing Anglican Article I, but it was gone by the
time the Articles were circulated in America. It is not clear who removed it, but perhaps it was Thomas
Coke. Cf. Ted A. Campbell, “The Mystery of the First Article of Religion, and the Mystery of Divine
Passibility,” OXFORDnotes 4.1 (24 May 1996): 5.
20Predestination Calmly Considered, §§47–50, John Wesley, 447–49.
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empowering and inclining source of our actions, with love being the prime example. Thus, when
he described love as God’s “reigning attribute, the attribute that sheds an amiable glory on all
[God’s] other perfections,” he was making emotion central to his conception of God.18 This helps
to explain why someone deleted the phrase denying passions to God from Article I of the edited
version of the Anglican Articles that Wesley prepared for the newly independent American
Methodists when they organized into a church.19 Far from being “above” responsive emotions,
Wesley affirmed a God who epitomized the proper response-ability of the emotions.
Omnipotence and Response-ability
How did Wesley square this affirmation of God’s responsiveness with the notion of
God’s omnipotence or sovereign power? He could define God’s omnipotence in fairly traditional
terms, as the exclusion of any bounds to God’s power. Whenever he developed this point
however, it became clear that his distinctive concern was that God’s power not be defined in any
way that would undercut the integrity of responsible grace.
Wesley discerned such a mistaken conception of Divine power in the claims of his
predestinarian opponents that they preserved the glory of God better than he did. Their obvious
assumption was that one could ascribe the full glory of salvation to God only if God effected
salvation unilaterally, rather than seeking responsively some human concurrence. Wesley
countered that affirming a place for God awaiting our uncoerced response to the divine initiative
did not detract from God’s glory, provided that it was God’s grace which enabled us to respond.
Moreover, he contended that the biblical notion of the “glory of God” does not refer primarily to
God’s power, it refers to the manifestation of all God’s attributes, especially justice and love.20
Wesley also stressed the relationship of God’s power with God’s
21Sermon 67, “On Divine Providence,” §14, Works 2:540.
22Thoughts Upon God’s Sovereignty, Works (Jackson) 10:361–63.
23Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §11, Works 2:489.
24E.g., NT Notes, Rom. 8:28; Sermon 66, “The Signs of the Times,” §II.9, Works 2:530; and
Sermon 118, “On the Omnipresence of God,” §II.1, Works 4:43.
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wisdom. As he once put it, were God to abolish sin and evil by overriding human freedom, “it
would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence. Whereas all the manifold
wisdom of God (as well as all his power and goodness) is displayed in governing [humans] as
[human]; not as a stock or a stone, but as an intelligent and free spirit.”21 It was as important for
Wesley that God be response-able in dealing with humanity as it was that God be omnipotent!
Indeed he reshaped the very conception of God’s omnipotence in light of this conviction.
A distinction between God’s work as Creator and as Governor was central to his case. Wesley
allowed that it may be permissible to speak of God working alone and irresistibly when creating
and sustaining nonpersonal nature, but not when governing human life—for this would eliminate
human responsibility.22 As Governor, God enables human obedience, but will not force it. As
Wesley reminded his followers,
You know how God wrought in your own soul when he first enabled you to say,
‘The life I now live, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave
himself for me.’ He did not take away your understanding, but enlightened and
strengthened it. He did not destroy any of your affections; rather they were more
vigorous than before. Least of all did he take away your liberty, your power of
choosing good or evil; he did not force you; but being assisted by his grace you…
chose the better part.23
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s conviction here is to say that he construed
God’s power or sovereignty fundamentally in terms of empowerment, rather than control or
overpowerment. This is not to weaken God’s power but to determine its character! As Wesley
was fond of saying, God works “strongly and sweetly” in matters of human life and salvation.24 
But this means that God also works responsively. Thus Wesley would insist that while God’s
empowering grace is always prevenient to any action on our part, “God does not continue to act
upon the soul unless the soul re-acts
25Sermon 19, “The Great Privilege of Those that are Born of God,” §III.3, Works 1:442.
26See the analysis and recommendation of this variant in Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 1:403–9.
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upon God. …He will not continue to breathe into our soul unless our soul
breathes toward him again.”25
Temporality and Response-ability
However attractive it sounds, the type of responsive interaction with individuals that
Wesley was ascribing to God in this 1748 sermon must eventually explain how this is possible
for God—since God’s relationship to time differs from that of humanity. But how does it differ?
What do we mean when we identify eternality as one of the distinctive attributes of the divine
nature? This question has been the focus of longstanding dispute. The dispute grows out of the
mingling of two different streams of reflection upon God’s nature in early Christian tradition.
The biblical roots of our tradition tend to describe eternity as “unending duration,” reflecting a
relative comfort with analogical use of human experience (such as our experience of duration) to
portray God. The Greco-Roman roots of our tradition tend to equate eternity with
“atemporality,” reflecting a tendency to see the divine nature as the opposite of everything that
we experience in creaturely existence as limitations (such as some aspects of being temporal).
Early Christian theologians were broadly drawn to the emphasis on atemporality. In its
strongest form this meant adopting Plato’s model of eternal realities, portraying God’s existence
as the antithesis of temporal succession—a tenseless unchanging Now (nunc stans in Latin). On
these terms, God embraces and knows all of time in a unity that dissolves the succession of
temporal events. Despite the difficulty of squaring this with biblical accounts of God’s activity,
influential theologians like Augustine adopted the nunc stans model of eternity, leading it to
become dominant in scholastic theologies. A subtle but significant variant of this model is
evident in some of these theologies. On this variant God exists “above” time, still embracing and
knowing all of time, but in a way that (proponents of this view believe) preserves the succession
of temporal reality.26 In other words, the biblical notion of duration is introduced, but the
atemporal emphasis is retained as most funda-
27See the critique of the coherence of this view as traditionally formulated and a proposed
refinement (drawing on John Duns Scotus) of conceiving God instead as “relatively timeless” in Alan G.
Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); or Padgett, “God
the Lord of Time,” in God and Time: Four Views, edited by Greg Ganssle (Downer’s Grove, IL:
Intervarsity, 2001).
28Cf. Predestination Calmly Considered, §18, John Wesley, 433. See also from the same time
period Wesley’s comments on Rom. 1:28 and 1 Peter 1:2 in NT Notes.
29See particularly two articles he extracted and reprinted in the Arminian Magazine: [Author not
given], “On the Eternity of God,” AM 3 (1780): 33–41; and Extracted from a late Author, “Of God’s
Immensity,” AM 9 (1786): 22–25, p. 23.
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mental.27 Almost no one prior to the eighteenth century ventured to go further and champion a
model of God as fundamentally temporal—that is, as existing in the ongoing passage of time as
we do, though without beginning or end. The clearest advocate was Socinius, and this was
included among the teachings for which he was condemned by both Protestant and Catholic
scholastics.
Where did Wesley’s convictions about God’s responsive interaction lead him in
assessing these three alternative models? There is little evidence of initial reticence about the
nunc stans model that he would have imbibed in his Anglican training. Indeed, when controversy
broke out between Wesleyan and Calvinist Methodists over predestination in the 1750s, he
readily appealed to the notion of God existing in the Eternal Now to explain how our eternal
election was based not on divine decree but on God’s timeless knowledge of our actual response
to the gracious offer of salvation.28 At least indirect endorsements of this model can be found
into the mid-1780s.29
But there is also evidence that in his later years Wesley began to sense that the classic
nunc stans model did not fit well his emphasis on God’s response-ability: If all “moments” of
time are experienced by God as simultaneously now, how could God sense and respond to
specific transitions in our lives? Concern to address this lack of fit would explain the increasing
use in Wesley’s later sermons of language to describe God’s relation to time that resonates more
with the “above time” variation of the typical scholastic model. An early example is a 1773
sermon that distilled the main themes of his prior controversial writings on predestination. In this
sermon Wesley again invoked the notion of an Eternal Now, but his extended description of how
God relates to time picks up some duration themes. While God sees all things in one view,
Wesley
30Sermon 58, “On Predestination,” §5, Works 2:417. See also §15 (2:420) which contains the
reference to the Eternal Now.
31See Sermon 54, “On Eternity,” §1, Works 2:358; Sermon 118, “On the Omnipresence of God,”
§I.2. Works 4:42; and Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §2, Works 4:61.
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stresses that what God sees runs “from everlasting to everlasting,” presenting the full span of
“whatever was, is, or will be to the end of time.”30 This emphasis is even stronger in sermons
after 1785, as the elder Wesley chooses to define God’s eternal existence not with reference to
an Eternal Now, but with more classically biblical language of  “everlastingness” or “boundless
duration.”31 He was clearly seeking a theological account that did justice to his conviction that
God interacts responsively with humanity in our temporal setting.
Prescience and Response-ability?
One of the shared aspects of the nunc stans model and the model emphasizing God as
“above time” was the assumption that God eternally knows not only what stands to us as past
and present, but also what stands to us as future. The classic way of affirming this was to say that
God—as omniscient—has prescience or foreknowledge of all future events, though it was
immediately added that this is at best an analogical expression (since nothing is truly “future” to
God). Whatever the precision of the claim, there is a deeper question about its implications.
Those in the Christian family who affirm unconditional election have often appealed to God’s
infallible foreknowledge as demonstrating the eternal certainty of our final states, and argued
that this means our choices concerning salvation could have been no different than they actually
were. This implication would obviously have been unacceptable to Wesley, with his concern to
maintain the integrity of our response to God’s interactive gracious work.
If one agreed that foreknowledge of our future choices truly undercuts their contingency,
the most obvious way to preserve the integrity of moral choices would be to deny (as Socinius
did) that God can have foreknowledge. Somewhat more modest is the proposal advanced by one
of Wesley’s prominent contemporaries (Andrew Ramsay) that while God exists “above time”
and is thus able to know the future, God vol-
32Cf. Andrew Michael Ramsay, The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion
(Glasgow: Robert Foulis, 1748), 142–74. Wesley’s initial reaction is evident in Letter to Dr. John
Robertson (24 September 1753), Works 26:517. Related responses can be found in NT Notes Acts 15:8;
and Letter to Richard Locke (14 September 1770), Letters (Telford) 5:199. But these must be balanced by
the fact that the elder Wesley published an excerpt of pages 161–74 of Ramsay as “Of the Foreknowledge
of God, extracted from a late author,” AM 8 (1785): 27–29, 88–90, 146–48.
33See Letter from Susanna Wesley (18 August 1725), Works 25:180.
34William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated (London: Samuel Palmer, 1724), 102.
Wesley read Wollaston in 1733.
35See Sermon 110, “Free Grace,” §§20, 29, Works 3:552–53, 558.
36Whitefield responded with a 1740 public letter titled Free Grace Indeed? that can be found
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untarily chooses not to exercise this ability in order to preserve human freedom. When Wesley
first encountered this proposal in the 1750s he rejected it summarily. While he showed some
possible openness to Ramsay’s proposal late in his life, Wesley generally assumed that the
biblical claim that God’s works are known unto God from eternity (Acts 15:18) requires
affirming divine prescience of all future events, even if there are difficulties in understanding
how this is consistent with human freedom.32
Actually, Wesley had long been aware of a model for explaining the consistency of
divine foreknowledge with human freedom. It had been recommended by his mother early in his
student years. This model holds that the certainty of divine prescience is one of recognition (like
in human perception), not one of causation. As Susanna put it, there is no more reason to
suppose “that the prescience of God is the cause that so many finally perish, than that our
knowing the sun will rise tomorrow is the cause of its rise.”33 As William Wollaston put it in a
book that Wesley read a little later at Oxford: “The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the
actions of free agents, because they will be; not that they will be, because He foresees them.”34
Wesley invoked this model (sometimes called “simple foreknowledge”) in his famous
1739 sermon “Free Grace,” the opening volley of his debate with George Whitefield and the
Calvinist Methodists. He argued that biblical claims about eternal election simply reflect God’s
ability as one “above time” to see from the beginning each individual’s final response to the
gracious—but  resistible—offer of salvation.35 While Whitefield was not convinced, others found
this argument persuasive.36 Thus it recurred
 in George Whitefield’s Journals, ed. Iain Murray (London: Banner of Truth, 1960), 571–88 (see p. 586).
For an immediate defense of Wesley against Whitefield by an Anglican in the North American colonies
see John Checkley, Dialogues between a minister and an honest country-man …. To which is annexed,
Divine prescience consistent with human liberty; or Mr. Wesley’s opinion of election and reprobation,
prov’d to be not so absurd as represented in a late letter … (Philadelphia: Andrew Bradford, Jacob
Duche, William Parsons, and Evan Morgan, 1741), 29–39.
37Predestination Calmly Considered, §18, John Wesley, 433; Sermon 58, “On Predestination,” §5,
Works 2:417; and Sermon 59, “God’s Love to Fallen Man,” §3, Works 2:424. It is also found in works he
reprinted in the Arminian Magazine: Thomas Goad, “A Discourse concerning the Necessity and
Contingency of Events in the World, in Respect of God’s Eternal Decrees,” AM 1 (1778): 250–64,
289–302 (see pp. 262, 301); and “Treatise on Election and Reprobation, extracted from a Late Author,”
AM 2 (1779): 161ff . I do not see Wesley showing reticence about this position as possibly compatibilist,
as suggested in Walter Lamoyne Parr Jr., “John Wesley’s Thoughts upon Necessity in his Search for the
Middle Verity” (University of Aberdeen Ph.D. thesis, 1994), 255–60, 276–79.
38It is surprising how little Fletcher deals with the specific topic of foreknowledge, but when he
does he insists that foreknowledge does not have a causative effect. Cf. Third Part of an Equal Check,
Section VI, in The Works of the Reverend John Fletcher. Late Vicar of Madeley (New York: Waugh &
Mason, 1835) 2:176–83; and An Answer to the Rev. Mr. Todlady’s “Vindication of the Decree,” Section
VIII, Works 2:462–67.
122
in every major subsequent work where Wesley challenged the notion of unconditional election.37 
It was also utilized by John Fletcher, Wesley’s close associate who offered an extended
apologetic for the Wesleyan position in debates with the Calvinists.38 On the weight of such
warrant it was established as the standard Wesleyan/Methodist position on divine foreknowledge
by Wesley’s death in 1791. Although we will find some of his nineteenth century heirs debating
the point, Wesley clearly judged this “simple foreknowledge” model to be consistent with both
the integrity of our human choices and the response-able nature of God.
Defending and Extending Wesley’s Trajectory in Nineteenth Century Methodism
Wesley’s mature pastoral/theological reflections on the divine attributes just considered
are sufficient for demonstrating his willingness to revise certain scholastic conceptions in order
to nurture among his people a sense of God’s responsive gracious interaction with humanity.
One might expect that his immediate heirs would push such revisions and nuances even further,
citing Wesley’s
39For a detailed discussion of this transition, focusing on the American Methodists, see Randy L.
Maddox, “An Untapped Inheritance:  American Methodism and Wesley’s Practical Theology,” in
Doctrines and Disciplines: Methodist Theology and Practice, edited by Dennis Campbell, et al.
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1999), 19–52, 292–309.
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precedent as warrant. Instead their energies were almost immediately consumed in resisting the
pressure to return to reigning scholastic conceptions.
Part of the reason that Wesley felt free to differ from Roman Catholic and Protestant
scholastic theologies was his self-conscious Anglican identity. While there are lines of
inheritance from both Protestant and Roman Catholic scholastic theologies in the Anglican
standards of doctrine, one of the significant ways these standards differed from the continental
model was in form. The Anglican church returned to the early church model of relying on first-
order forms like liturgy, creed, and catechetical sermons as standards of doctrine. The closer
connection of these forms to the daily worship and life of the church served to nuance and enrich
some of the abstract conceptions of the divine attributes that had made their way into scholastic
theological debate.
It is against this background that we can appreciate the theological impact of the rapid
“de-Anglicanization” of Methodism. This process began when American Methodists formed the
The Methodist Episcopal Church following the Revolutionary War. After Wesley’s death British
Methodists quickly formalized their own independent existence, and worked to define
themselves overagainst their Anglican mother. This threw Methodists in both settings into
primary dialogue with churches rooted in continental Protestantism, and they soon realized that
their inherited (Anglican) forms of theological expression were not considered “real” theology in
these circles. Their response was not to question the primacy of the continental forms, but to
focus their energies on developing the scholastic theology for Methodism that Wesley had
lamentably failed to provide.39 In the process they inevitably had to explain places where Wesley
had diverged from scholastic conceptions of the nature of God. And to the degree that they were
concerned to defend their status as orthodox Protestants, there was pressure to reconsider these
divergences.
40For a detailed account of the actions described in this paragraph, see Ian Sellers, Adam Clarke,
Controversialist: Wesleyanism and the Historic Faith in the Age of Bunting (St. Columb Major: Wesley
Historical Society, 1976). This work was drawn to my attention by Martin Astell.
41See Adam Clarke, The Holy Bible…with a Commentary and Critical Notes (London: J. & T.
Clarke, 1810), comment on Acts 2:47. See also his description of God as above time in his comment on
Luke 1:34.
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Conservative Precedent of Nineteenth Century British Methodism
The growing impact of such pressure is evident in nineteenth century British Methodism.
The generation that overlapped Wesley’s death continued to rely on forms of theological
expression aimed at instructing the entire community, particularly sermon collections and
general Bible commentaries. The most widely recognized of this generation was Adam Clarke,
but Clarke was also the center of much controversy in Methodist circles precisely because he
challenged some traditional theological conceptions in his multi-volume commentary.40 Most
relevant to our investigation was a controversy sparked by Clarke’s comment on the reference to
God’s “fore-ordained knowledge” in Acts 2. True to his Wesleyan roots, Clarke sought a way to
understand this phrase that did not equate it with unconditional election. His main strategy was
to invoke the now standard model of God existing above time and thereby observing (rather than
causing) our future choices and actions. But then Clarke ventured a step further—on analogy
with Wesley’s argument that omnipotence did not require that God actually control all that God
could control, Clarke proposed that “God, though omniscient, is not obliged, in consequence of
this to know all that he can know.”41
In other words, Clarke embraced more overtly than the elder Wesley the proposal of
Andrew Ramsay that we should understand God as voluntarily renouncing prescience of at least
some future events, in order to preserve human responsibility. But when Clarke “extended”
Wesley’s trajectory on this point, official British Methodism was not willing to follow. The
initial draft of his commentary was refused by the Book Committee in 1799, citing in part the
publication underway of Thomas Coke’s six-volume commentary. When Conference then issued
Joseph’s Benson’s commentary in 1809 as a second official work, the ignored Clarke reluctantly
agreed
42Cf. Christian Theology: By Adam Clarke, LL.D., F.A.S.; selected from his published and
unpublished writings, by Samuel Dunn (London: Tegg, 1835), 69–70, 74.
43Richard Watson, Theological Institutes; or, A View of the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals, and
Institutions of Christianity, 3 vols. (London: Mason, 1823). Page references in the following two
paragraphs refer to this edition.
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to move ahead with an independent press. As he prepared to issue a revised version in 1830,
Clarke checked once more with the Book Steward; told that he would have to remove all
“objectionable” passages, he again settled for an independent press. Even Samuel Dunn’s
compendium of excerpts on various doctrinal topics from Clarke’s writings (prepared shortly
after his death) was released outside Conference auspices, despite the fact that Dunn had
carefully omitted the controversial proposals.42
The effort to distance themselves from Clarke reflects a key agenda of British Methodist
leaders in these early decades, which was to gain the theological respect of their dialogue
partners in the other dissenting traditions. They soon sensed that a prerequisite to this goal was
having a comprehensive and carefully organized survey of Methodist belief and practice that
engaged the long tradition of Christian theological debate, defended any controverted Methodist
claims, and provided rational grounding for the whole—that is, a Methodist “scholastic
theology.” Richard Watson published his Theological Institutes as the pioneering work in this
genre in 1823, and it remained the standard British Methodist theology text for over half a
century.43 It has frequently been noted that Watson seldom quotes Wesley in this work. While
this is true, it is largely because of Watson’s recognition that his non-Methodist critics would not
consider Wesley to serve as a significant warrant, since he was not a “serious” theologian.
Careful reading reveals Watson’s actual concern to articulate and defend Wesley’s stance on
several debated issues, including those related to the doctrine of God that we have been
considering.
For example, in his discussion of immutability (1:435–37) Watson echoed Wesley’s
defense of the biblical claim of God “repenting,” arguing that a God who fails to take into
account the changing response of humanity would not be truly unchangeable in righteousness
and love. He likewise faithfully affirmed the ascription of passions or affections to God.
Concerning the topic of omnipotence, Watson reiterated the claim that God’s power is self-
limited
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by God’s nature, particularly by God’s wisdom and goodness in wanting to deal with humans as
responsible agents (1:403, 3:174–77). Reflecting his more scholastic sensitivities, when Watson
took up the question of God’s relationship to time he enlarged upon the hints in Wesley’s late
sermons (1:395–99). He spelled out the objections to the nunc stans model and then defended at
some length the biblical language of God’s “eternal duration.” He clearly took this language to
imply a model of God as “above time,” able to recognize succession in events without being
confined to the present.
Watson’s discussion of foreknowledge is particularly interesting (1:416–27). He joined
Wesley in defending the simple foreknowledge model, insisting that God’s foreknowledge has
“no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is
knowledge and not influence” (422). But the main opponents against which Watson directed his
argument were not the predestinarians, they were those who were ready to deny divine
prescience in order to protect human freedom! Watson considered first Andrew Ramsay’s
suggestion that God voluntarily renounces prescience (he tactfully did not mention Clarke’s
similar proposal). He rejected this possibility as contradictory, contending that the phrase
“knowledge of God” refers not just to God’s capacity to acquire knowledge but to God actually
comprehending all things that are and that can be (418). He then turned to the stronger claim of
Socinius that knowledge of future contingent events is metaphysically impossible even for the
omniscient (temporal) God, since these events do not yet exist as something to be known.
Watson’s immediate rejoinder to this claim was to cite biblical prophecies that he assumed
involved God’s certain knowledge of future contingent events (418–20). But he added that “the
great fallacy of this argument is its assumption that certain prescience of a moral action destroys
its contingent nature, for this supposes that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each
other when the real opposite of contingent is not certainty but necessity” (421). In other words,
he saw in Socinius the mirror position of the predestinarians, both based on the same mistaken
assumption.
On balance, while Watson adopted the form and tone of scholastic theology, he used
these tools to clarify and defend places where
44Page references in this and the next paragraphs are to William Burt Pope,  A Compendium of
Christian Theology, 2nd edition (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1879).
45Pope, Compendium, 1:299. Actually, the position that Pope is groping for seems much like the
notion of God as “relatively timeless” developed by Alan Padgett (see note 27 above).
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Wesley had challenged or revised scholastic conceptions of God’s nature. But the longer that
British Methodist theologians worked within the scholastic genre the more pressure there was to
minimize the ways that Wesley had pushed the edges!
This can be illustrated by the most thoroughgoing scholastic theology produced in British
Methodism: William Burt Pope’s Compendium of Christian Theology, published in 1875.44 Pope
consistently affirmed as much of the traditional conception of the divine attributes as he could,
without conceding the crucial Wesleyan conviction. His discussion of immutability for example
focused on denying any development in God; there is little mention of the debated topic of
whether God has passions, though Pope finally insisted that we must understand the attribute in a
way that allows God to interact with us “personally” (1:302–4). Likewise Pope adopted the
traditional framing of omnipotence as an application of divine freedom, but then used this to
defend God’s “freedom” to self-limit omnipotence in order to allow a measure of  freedom to
humans (1:311–13). And he directed discussion of omniscience with somewhat greater ease to
the simple foreknowledge model, stressing how this avoids unconditional election (1:315–19).
Pope’s discussion of God’s relation to time is the most interesting. Without listing
Watson by name (or discussing Wesley’s later sermons), he criticized those who dismiss the
model of the Eternal Now in favor of assigning duration to God. He endorsed the scholastic
claim that the Divine essence in itself must be absolutely unconditioned, thus it can experience
no succession of time. But then he argued that in dealing with creation God must behold, direct,
and control all things as under the law to time (1:297–99). As he summarized this balance a little
later: “Instead of saying with the schoolmen that to God there is only an eternal now, it were
better to say that to God as absolute essence there is the eternal now, and also to God as related
to the creature there is the process of succession” (1:317). Anticipating the question of how both
claims can be true, he appealed to mystery.45 What remains no
46Shinn, An Essay on the Plan of Salvation (Baltimore: Neal, Wills & Cole, 1813), 230.
47Cf. the examples cited censoriously in James Anderson, Strictures on Arminian Methodism
(Lancaster, OH: J.R. Dixon, 1844), 18–19.
48Page references in the next three paragraphs refer to Billy Hibbard, Memoirs of the Life and
Travels of B. Hibbard, 2nd edition (New York: for the author, 1843), 369–414. Note that this section was
not present in Hibbard’s 1825 first edition of Memoirs.
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mystery is the fact that the basic Wesleyan conviction of God’s response-able nature served as
the limit of Pope’s concessions to scholastic tradition.
The Tentative Independence of Early American Methodist Theology
The “primitivist” strain in American Methodism allowed, in theory, greater independence
from both Wesley and scholastic theology than is evident in the British precedent. This strain
reflected the optimistic assumption that pilgrimage to the New World had provided freedom
from the tyranny of all past tradition and the opportunity to reinstitute the beliefs and practice of
the New Testament church. Thus we get a methodology like that affirmed by Asa Shinn in An
Essay on the Plan of Salvation, one of the first theological monographs by an American
Methodist:
Each one is bound under a sacred obligation, to go to the Bible for [one’s] system
of divinity, and so far as any is governed by a regard to any human creed, in the
formation of [one’s] religious opinions, so far [one] is deficient in the very
principle of Christian faith; and pays that homage to human authority that is due
only to the Divine.46
In retrospect, the naivete of this mandate is palpable; American Methodists constantly
drew upon traditional theological proposals in their interpretation of Scripture. At the same time,
they were somewhat less reticent about championing marginal or non-majority proposals. In
particular, it appears that a number of early American preachers embraced Adam Clarke’s notion
of God voluntarily laying aside prescience.47 The most striking case was Billy Hibbard Sr., an
early circuit rider who published in his Memoirs an extended argument that God does not
foreknow future contingent events.48 Hibbard had long puzzled over how to relate Divine
prescience to human freedom and said he found no help
49Compare Hibbard, Memoirs, 373–76 to AM 8 (1785): 27–29, 88–90, 146–48 (cf. note 32
above).
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in the authors he had read on the topic until he came across an extract on foreknowledge with
which he fully agreed in “Mr. Wesley’s American (sic) Magazine, ninth volume.” Fortunately,
Hibbard reprints (an abridgement of) the extract before commenting on it. Thereby it can be
verified that he was actually reading the extract of Ramsay that Wesley published in volume
eight of the Arminian Magazine.49
 The stated goal of the extract is to find a medium between the extremes of fatalism
(God’s prescience renders all future events necessary) and Socinianism (God is not able to
foresee or foretell any of the actions of free agents). But it does not present the “simple
foreknowledge” alternative that had become standard in Methodism. Instead it asserts that God
knows everything past and present (as well as all logical truths) with certainty, but perceives
future events only as possible. Over against the fatalists it emphasizes that this requires God to
know all of the possible future combinations of physical and moral causes, and to prepare for all
contingencies, which it argues is “far more perfect than to foresee infallibly only one sort of
events, and exclude all the others, by an omnipotent, irresistible power” (374). Over against the
Socinians it insists that God is theoretically able to foresee, foreordain, and execute whatever
God pleases, but God “neither foresees nor foreordains as infallibly future, what he leaves to the
free choice of intellectual agents, because this is repugnant and contradictory” (376). In other
words, it develops the model of a voluntary surrender of prescience like that tentatively
advanced by Clarke.
Hibbard appended to this first extract another of unidentified origin that argued that any
notion of prescience—even a notion with God “above time”—leads necessarily to unconditional
predestination (376–86). Taking his own voice, Hibbard offered an extended endorsement of this
necessary connection (405–12). On that basis he argued that affirming divine prescience made
God the author of sinning, contradicting both the divine perfection and human moral agency
(387–90). This led him to charge (with reference to Richard Watson) that “the advocates of
eternal prescience apart from predestination are far more inconsistent than
50Hibbard, Memoirs, 412. The references to Watson are on pp. 400–3. Ironically, Hibbard also
targets Clarke in this critique (see 405), even though he is actually defending a position like that which
Clarke had tentatively suggested. Perhaps Hibbard had only read the collection of excerpts from Clarke’s
writings, which omit this suggestion.
51Watson was on the course of study for The Methodist Episcopal Church from 1833–92; The
Methodist Protestant Church, 1830–1920; The African Methodist Episcopal Church, 1844–92; The
African Methodist Episcopal Church Zion, 1872–1900; The Methodist Episcopal Church South,
1878–1906; and The Colored (Christian) Methodist Episcopal Church, 1872–1920.
52E.g., Anonymous [Joshua Soule?], “Thoughts on the Foreknowledge of God,” MQR 3 (1820):
11–14, 49–53; La Roy Sunderland, “Unoriginated Decrees,” MQR 16 (1833): 322–40; S [Abel
Stephens?], “God’s Determinant Counsel and Foreknowledge,” MQR 21 (1839): 39–61, esp. 41; and
Henry Bidleman Bascom, “The Divine Prescience not Inconsistent with Free Agency of Man,” MQRS 1
(1847) 161–75.
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their predestinarian brethren … and I call upon them as ingenious and honest men, either to
reject their notion of a certain prescience of a contingent event, or to renounce the doctrine of
human liberty.”50 The alternative that Hibbard recommended paralleled the first extract. As he
put it colloquially, “God knows just what he has a mind to know, and what he has not a mind to
know, he lets alone” (413).
The most striking thing about Hibbard’s discussion is the extensiveness (particularly in
comparison with Clarke) with which he developed this model of self-limited foreknowledge. For
example, in its defense he cited scriptural claims about God being grieved by human decisions to
sin (395). And responding to the use of  biblical prophecies as proof of prescience, he argued
that prophecies are just expressions of God’s intention to accomplish in the future something that
is within God’s power and nature to do—which would not include determining future contingent
actions (404). Despite the vigor of his argument, Hibbard did not succeed in convincing leading
voices in contemporary American Methodism of the superiority of his model.
The reality is that—whatever their independence in other areas—through most of the
nineteenth century formal teaching on the doctrine of God among American Methodists echoed
that of their British counterpart. Across the range of the splintering American family they readily
assigned Watson’s Institutes as the main theology text on the course of study for prospective
elders.51 Discussion of the topics we have been considering in their denominational journals
defended the stance that Watson had expounded, particularly the “simple foreknowledge” model
of God as a rebuttal to predestination.52
53E.g., Amos Binney, Theological Compend (New York: Carlton & Lanahan, 1840), 53; Thomas
Neely Ralston,  Elements of Divinity (Louisville: Martin & Griswold, 1847), 23–26; and Samuel
Wakefield, A Complete System of Christian Theology (Pittsburgh: J. L. Read and Son, 1869; original,
1862), 145–59.
54See Thomas O. Summers, Systematic Theology, 2 Volumes (Nashville: Publishing House of the
MECS, 1888), on eternity (1:75–80), immutability (1:80–82), omnipotence (1:84), and omniscience
(1:85–90).
55See for example Daniel Whedon, The Freedom of the Will (New York: Carlton & Porter, 1864),
273–74; and Thomas Summers’ rejection of the suggestion that Clarke speaks for all Methodists
(Systematic Theology 1:88). On the status of editors like Whedon and Summers as exercising the teaching
office see Russell E. Richey, “The Legacy of Francis Asbury: The Teaching Office in Episcopal
Methodism,” Quarterly Review 15 (1995): 145–74.
56Lorenzo Dow McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God, and Cognate Themes in Theology and
Philosophy (Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden, 1878). Page references in this and the following three
paragraphs are to this book.
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And when American authors began producing their own survey texts the early generations drew
their discussion of the divine attributes direct from Watson.53 Even on the conservative side,
someone as concerned to demonstrate continuity with classical Christian tradition as Thomas
Summers retained the major points about God’s response-able nature that had been made by
Wesley and passed along in slightly refined form in Watson.54
Solidifying the Progressive Strand in American Methodist Theology, 1875–1900 
Throughout the nineteenth century those who exercised the teaching office in American
Methodism steadfastly rejected any equation of official Methodist teaching with the occasional
suggestion of individual Methodists that the only way to avoid predestination was to deny that
God has foreknowledge of future contingent events.55 For most of the century this rejection
required little elaboration, because the suggestions were either tentative (like Clarke) or from
persons of marginal theological influence (like Hibbard). Near the end of the century this
situation changed dramatically, owing largely to the impact of one writer—Lorenzo Dow
McCabe.
McCabe taught philosophy for more than thirty years at Ohio Wesleyan University. Like
his namesake (Lorenzo Dow, the flamboyant circuit rider), McCabe was not afraid to challenge
conventional Methodist stances when convinced that this was what truth required. In 1878 he
published through the MEC publishing house a vigorous philosophical and theological critique
of the “simple foreknowledge” model of God.56 In this work he
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specifically rejected the contentions of Wesley, Watson, and Whedon that this model provides a
logically defensible way of allowing divine prescience while preserving human accountability
(cf. 21, 161, 310–15). Moreover, he argued that the basic assumption of Clarke’s alternative
model—that God could foreknow future contingent actions, but chooses not to do so—was also
fallacious (218–19). What both models fail to realize, McCabe insisted, is that there can be
certain knowledge only of past facts, logical necessities, and future actions that are totally
determined by present causal factors. Truly contingent future actions can only be anticipated as
possibilities, not foreknown as existing facts.
The conventional Methodist response to McCabe would be to allow that this is true for
human knowledge, since we are temporal creatures, but to deny that God exists “in the present”
like we do. However, this is where McCabe disagreed most fundamentally with earlier Wesleyan
tradition. He charged that Wesley should have gone further in reversing the scholastic emphasis
on God’s atemporal nature, an emphasis that Wesley recognized was hard to align with the
biblical accounts of God engaging temporal human beings in a truly responsive manner
(223–24). McCabe was convinced that the only way to achieve Wesley’s underlying concern of
affirming God’s response-able nature was to affirm that God experiences succession in a way
that is not fundamentally different from how we experience it. As he put it rhetorically: “has God
no attraction for what is new? Has he no capability of the delightful experiences of wonder and
surprise and variety? We ought never to lose sight of what God has explicitly revealed of himself
when he declares that we were made in his own image and likeness” (174).
This quotation makes clear that McCabe assumed the God revealed in Scripture and
Christian life is more appropriately conceived in terms of the model of a “person” than that of an
“Unmoved Mover.” To speak of God as a “person,” related meaningfully to a contingent world,
demanded in McCabe’s view that temporality itself be a primary, not a secondary experience of
God (259ff). But how does God’s experience of temporality differ from our own? McCabe is a
little ambiguous on this point. In one setting he describes God’s eternal existence as simply
duration with-
57This suggestion would come close to the position defended by William Craig in Ganssle, ed.,
God and Time.
58Lorenzo Dow McCabe, Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies A Necessity, Being an
Introduction to “The Foreknowledge of God, and Cognate Themes” (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1882).
(Note: Nescience is the opposite of prescience).
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out beginning or end (382–83). Elsewhere he seems to suggest that God was atemporal before
creation, and freely adopted the self-limitation of entering into temporality as part of the decision
to create a universe with true temporality, novelty, and freedom (cf. 204–5, 387).57
However McCabe’s account of divine eternity is sorted out, it is clear that he viewed his
temporal conception of God as particularly appropriate to the biblical accounts of a God who
experiences states of feeling and is open to change (see 272ff, 313). But how did it fit with the
notion of God as omniscient? Anticipating charges that he unduly limited God’s knowledge,
McCabe emphasized that God would know all the interrelated contingent possibilities of the
future—which is infinitely more than knowing only the possibilities that will be realized (250).
This anticipatory knowledge would allow God to be prepared for providential action. Moreover,
since God would be able to discern relative probabilities it would account for some of the
biblical prophecies (153ff). Yet McCabe agreed that other prophecies, like that of Peter’s triple
denial, seemed too specific to account for in this way. He assumed that in these few cases God
must override human liberty to fulfill the prophecy, but added that as a result the persons
involved would not be morally accountable for their acts (88–92)!
As this last proposal suggests, McCabe was still thinking through many dimensions of his
overall model of God and foreknowledge. In 1882 he published a second book titled Divine
Nescience of Future Contingencies A Necessity, which he described as an introduction to the first
work.58 In this follow-up he identified his main target as “the Augustinian conception of God that
has captured most theology to present which so far elevates the conception of God to a universal
infinite that it logically annihilates him in his concrete personality.” McCabe’s alternative goal
was an account of God rooted in facts of religious experience and scriptural testimony that
portrayed God as capable of relating fully to the contingencies of personal life and historical
change (17–18). At
59See particularly the first published review of Foreknowledge of God by “GH” [likely Gilbert
Haven] in MQR 61 (1879): 162–66. Other short negative evaluations of McCabe in this influential journal
include George Steele, “Dr. McCabe on the Divine Prescience,” MQR 74 (1892): 963–65; W.W.W.
Wilson, “Prescience or Nescience—Which?” MQR 76 (1894): 639; and Austin H. Herrick, “An Objection
to Divine Nescience,” MQR 76 (1894): 639.
60See Lorenzo Dow McCabe, “Prescience of Future Contingencies Impossible,” MQR 74 (1892):
760–73, esp. p. 773.
61Note how central this issue is to the evaluations of McCabe in Loring C. Webster, The End from
the Beginning; or, Divine Prescience vs. Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies (Cincinnati: Cranston
& Curts, 1895), esp. 308–30; and Randolph S. Foster, God: Nature and Attributes (New York: Eaton &
Mains, 1897), 200ff.
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the heart of this account was the argument that divine prescience of future contingent actions is
logically and metaphysically impossible. While there is considerable overlap with the first book,
a few items of interest emerge in this study. For example, McCabe devoted more attention to
practical implications of his model for such central religious issues as prayer and theodicy. He
developed the logical point that if future contingents do not yet exist, it is not a restriction of
omniscience to deny God’s knowledge of them (191). And he returned to the issue of prophecy,
this time highlighting how the numerous conditional prophecies in scripture fit his model (76).
As one would expect, McCabe’s ambitious revisionary proposal generated significant
response. Much of the initial response was negative. Two concerns came up repeatedly. One was
the charge that McCabe was playing into the hands of those Calvinists who reject the Methodist
affirmation of human freedom, because McCabe granted their assumption that divine prescience
necessarily eliminates authentic human freedom.59 In response McCabe argued that
predestinarian Calvinism would have been discredited long ago if misguided Arminians had not
continued to defend the doctrine of divine prescience.60 The second common claim advanced
against McCabe’s proposal was that the many scriptural prophecies of specific future contingent
events compel us to affirm divine prescience, whatever the theological quandaries this might
pose. It was not hard for those stressing this concern to demonstrate the inadequacy of McCabe’s
scattered attempts to account for the range of apparent prophetic material in scripture.61
Unfortunately, they did not engage the more extended discussion of this topic in Joel Hayes’ The
Foreknowledge of God, a book published through the Southern Methodist publishing house
about a decade
62Joel S. Hayes, The Foreknowledge of God; or, the Omniscience of God Consistent with His own
Holiness and Man’s Free Agency (Nashville: MECS Publishing House, 1890). Over half of the book
(187–397) is devoted to discussing both those scriptures that Hayes believes support his model and those
that appear to undercut it. Among his contributions to points made by McCabe are a recognition that
many supposed specific prophecies are evident only by selective hindsight (272), and an insistence that
God can promise future providential action without implying that God rigidly controls all the variables
leading up to that action (218).
63J. F. Hurst, “Introduction,” in McCabe, Foreknowledge of God, 7–15. 
64See Whedon’s review of Divine Nescience in MQR 65 (1883): 176–77; and McCabe’s claim
that Whedon only reluctantly published “GH’s” earlier negative review of Foreknowledge (Divine
Nescience, 290). Remember that Whedon accepted the “simple foreknowledge” model, which held there
was no necessary conflict between foreknowledge and freedom.
65See Foster, God, 181 & 187 (on Foster’s preference for Pope see 18–20).Cf. McCabe’s report of
Foster’s compliments on his first book, in Divine Nescience, 290.
66John Miley, Systematic Theology, 2 Vols. (New York: Hunt and Eaton, 1892–94).
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after those of McCabe that argues for the same basic model of God’s temporal nature and
knowledge.62
Given how the “simple foreknowledge” model of God had dominated official teaching
for nearly a century, the most interesting aspect of the reaction to McCabe’s revisionist proposal
was the emerging openness it encountered among influential voices in Northern Methodism.
John F. Hurst (president of Drew Theological Seminary and soon to be elected an MEC bishop)
provided the cautiously supportive introduction to McCabe’s first volume.63 Daniel Whedon
(prominent editor of the Methodist Quarterly Review) protested any suggestion that McCabe
verged on heresy, arguing that while he did not believe McCabe’s proposed revision was
necessary, it deserved a tolerant hearing.64 Even Randolph Foster (a MEC bishop), who offered
an extended defense of William Pope’s model of foreknowledge over that of McCabe, prefaced
his arguments with a description of McCabe as an “orthodox of the orthodox of Arminian faith”
whose books deserved careful reading. Significantly, Foster allowed to McCabe that prescience
of contingent events was not absolutely necessary for God’s just and perfect administration of
the universe.65
In retrospect the most significant nineteenth-century engagement with McCabe’s
proposal was that of John Miley (longtime professor of theology at Drew) in his Systematic
Theology, published in 1892.66 Miley’s discussion of omniscience included a direct dialogue
with McCabe (1:180–85). In this dialogue Miley argued in favor of prescience, based mainly on
the apparent evidence of
67Note for example the defense of McCabe by appeal to Miley in H.C. Buss, “Prescience of
Future Contingencies,” MQR 75 (1893):968.
68See Milton Terry, “Nescience and God,” MQR 81 (1899): 112–13; J. Wallace Webb,
“Nescience of God,” MQR 81 (1899): 464–65; J. S. Breckinridge, “Nescience of God,” MQR 81 (1899):
622–25; and Milton Terry, “Nescience of God,” MQR 81 (1899): 628–29
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biblical prophecy, but he added that accepting divine nescience would not undermine any vital
Methodist doctrines. Rather, “the chief perceivable result would be to free the system from the
perplexity for freedom which arises with the divine prescience” (1:185). Turning his focus from
human freedom to the biblical accounts of God experiencing changing feelings and acting
providentially in our world, Miley conceded that both types of accounts are more
comprehensible to us if we reject divine prescience than if we assume it (1:189–92). Going
further, he insisted that “if the ministries of providence in the free agency of God, with all the
emotional activities of such ministries, be not consistent or possible with his foreknowledge,
then foreknowledge cannot be true” (1:192). But he stopped just short of actually embracing this
conclusion, suggesting that such inconsistency had not yet been decisively proven.
It might not be surprising that some readers sensed an implicit endorsement of McCabe
behind Miley’s carefully stated qualifications.67 At the very least Miley clearly placed McCabe’s
position within the boundaries of legitimate alternative theological “opinions” for Methodists.
This placement was significant because Miley’s Systematic Theology served as the assigned text
in the course of study for pastoral ministry in the MEC from 1892–1908. Thereby it provided
more impetus than had existed previously for those being trained to consider moving beyond
simply defending the revisions that Wesley himself had made in certain scholastic assumptions
about God; they could join McCabe in extending the trajectory of these revisions by affirming
God’s fully “temporal” nature. One evidence that it was having this effect can be seen in the
1899 volume of the Methodist Quarterly Review. In an early issue Milton Terry (theologian at
Garrett Theological Seminary) published an editorial essay criticizing Clarke and McCabe for
rejecting prescience and opening the door to the notion that God can “grow.” This essay quickly
drew two rejoinders from MEC pastors who defended McCabe and quizzed Terry about why the
notion of God having new experiences was objectionable.68
69Cf. the appreciative study of McCabe in William McGuire King, “Future Contingents: A
Nineteenth-Century Theory,” Process Studies 9 (Fall 1979): 105–15.
70See J. Scott Lidgett The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life (London: Charles Kelly,
1902). Page numbers in this paragraph refer to this book.
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The Progressive Wesleyan Trajectory through the mid-Twentieth Century
There have been many Methodists/Wesleyans from Terry’s time to the present who
would echo his objection to the notion of a God who has truly new experiences or “grows” in
any sense. By contrast, process theologians champion this notion. Given the role that Lorenzo
Dow McCabe played in creating room in American Methodist circles for serious consideration
of a model of God as truly temporal, contemporary Wesleyan process theologians can very
appropriately look back to him as one of the significant forerunners of their stance.69 The task
that remains for our consideration is to trace briefly how this type of progressive extension of
Wesley’s original trajectory found a growing place through the mid-twentieth century in
Methodism, creating a receptiveness to explicit process theology as it emerged.
The Progressive Spirit in British Methodist Theology
British Methodist theology maintained a fairly uniform conservative stance through the
nineteenth century, ignoring or resisting most of the emerging intellectual challenges in biblical
and historical studies as well as in the natural sciences. With the turn of the century came a
striking new spirit and approach, a willingness to question old certainties and become more
forward-looking. This new spirit was particularly evident in the British Methodists who emerged
as prominent biblical scholars, as they strove to engage the canonical materials more on their
own terms than through ill-fitting traditional assumptions. While fewer in number, there were
British Methodist doctrinal theologians who embodied a similar concern.
J. Scott Lidgett was the pioneer of this group, and can serve as representative. He is most
noted for his advocacy of reclaiming the doctrine of The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth
and Life.70 In Lidgett’s framing this doctrine had
71These essays collected in J. Scott Lidgett, God and the World (London: Epworth, 1943).
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nothing to do with God’s gender, it was an affirmation that we must conceive of the creation of
humankind as
the calling into existence by God, out of His own life, of beings at once kindred
with Himself, and having a distinct individuality of their own. ... [this creation] is
motivated by the love of God; introduces them into a world, a home, of love,
which environs their whole life; and has, at its end, that fellowship of mutual
giving and receiving, that most intimate communion, which can only be between
those who are spiritually akin (288).
Lidgett contended that this sense of the Fatherhood of God, while clearly taught in scripture, was
obscured in later Christian tradition by an alternative emphasis on the abstract ideal of Divine
Sovereignty. He traced this alternative emphasis back to the influence of Platonism on Christian
reflection (164–66), and stressed Augustine’s role in helping this model of God as Sovereign
become dominant in medieval theology (180–200). He then lauded how this dominant model had
been called into question in recent years, specifically praising early Methodism for its
contribution to recovering the stress on Divine Fatherhood (267–70).
The conception of God as existing in the Eternal Now was one aspect of the previously
dominant model that Lidgett identified as needing revision, but his 1902 book provides little
sense of his alternative. For this we must turn to a series of essays published in Contemporary
Review in the 1930s.71 The most relevant is a 1938 essay where Lidgett affirms that time must
have reality for God, “because it is the condition of His progressive self-giving to and through
the process of His world” (109). Lidgett was interacting with Alfred North Whitehead’s new
book Modes of Thought in this essay, and specifically praised Whitehead for his interpretation of
reality in terms of universal process (112)! He clearly felt some sympathy with the emerging
process model of a temporal God. It could allow a more response-able God, as long as God was
actually able to respond. In this latter connection, Lidgett had reservations about Whitehead’s
insistence that God always interacts with us in the mode of persuasion, never more actively.
Lidgett considered
72E.g., David Pailin, Groundwork of Philosophy of Religion. London: Epworth, 1986; and Pailin,
God and the Processes of Reality. 
73This would be the “empirical theology” epitomized by Harris Franklin Rall. For his method see
Rall, “Theology, Empirical and Christian,” in Contemporary American Theology, edited by Vergilius
Ferm (New York: Round Table, 1933) 2:245–73.
74Cf. Harris Franklin Rall, The Meaning of God (Nashville: Cokesbury, 1925); Rall, What Can I
Believe (Chicago: Commission on Men’s Work, Board of Education, MEC, 1933); and Rall, A Faith for
Today (New York: Abingdon, 1936), 88ff.
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this to be an overreaction to the distorted emphasis on God’s coercive sovereignty that developed
in Christianity with the displacement of the biblical theme of Divine Fatherhood. This led him to
argue that the new Reformation which Whitehead desired should be brought about, “not by
dismissing God from Creative Sovereignty over the world, but by exploring more deeply and
setting forth more fully His fatherhood” (19).
Although there was admittedly some distance yet to cover, the sympathy expressed for
themes in Whitehead by a person of Lidgett’s stature in the 1930s solidified the trajectory within
which explicit process theology could emerge in the 1980s.72 This emergence was delayed
mainly by the priority British Methodists gave to biblical and social/political theologies over
philosophical theology. It is one thing to identify problems with models of God on exegetical or
other grounds; it is another to construct detailed alternatives. The only ones likely to invest time
in the second activity are those who consider the metaphysical enterprise central to the
theological task. 
Developments in American Methodist Theology
This reality is reflected as well in a branching within progressive (or “liberal”) American
Methodist theology in the first half of the twentieth century. One branch of this stream limited
itself in principle to descriptive accounts of Christian experience.73 These accounts rarely
address (one way or the other) such traditional debates as God’s relation to time.74 The other
branch characterized such empirical work as merely preliminary to the rational task of
constructing a metaphysical account of Christian belief. This branch was dominated by Boston
Personalism, the most influential “school” in American Methodist theology during this period,
and it is in this school that most accounts locate the immediate precedents to process theology in
Methodism. 
The founder of Boston Personalism was Borden Parker Bowne.
75Bowne’s major philosophical works include: Metaphysics (New York: Harper, 1882),
Philosophy of Theism (New York: Harper, 1887; revised as Theism [New York: American Book Co.,
1902]), and Personalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908).
76Compare Bowne, Theism, 184–85; to Bowne, Metaphysics, 190. See also the discussion of
Bowne’s ambivalence on this topic in E. S. Brightman, “A Temporalist View of God,” Journal of
Religion 12 (1932): 545–55, esp. 551–52; and Rufus Burrow Jr., Personalism: A Critical Introduction
(St. Louis: Chalice, 1999), 142–48.
77See Francis John McConnell, Is God Limited? (New York: Abingdon, 1924),123–24.
78This is central to his followup book: McConnell, The Christlike God: A Survey of the Divine
Attributes from the Christian Point of View (New York: Abingdon, 1927).
79See respectively McConnell, Is God Limited?, 283–93; and Christlike God, 73–86.
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Bowne championed a type of neo-Kantian idealism (which he named “personalism”) as the
metaphysic most appropriate to Christian faith and most adequate by modern standards.75 He
gave particular prominence to elaborating the conception of God as the ultimate “person,” as an
alternative to the scholastic model. One might assume that this led him to share McCabe’s stress
on God’s temporality, but Bowne’s Kantian commitments pushed instead for God’s
transcendence of the particularities of the temporal order. The most he was willing to propose
was a position like that of William Pope, where God is atemporal in essential nature but able to
engage the created order temporally.76
It was Francis John McConnell who introduced a stress on God’s truly temporal nature
into the typical themes of Boston Personalism. His 1924 book titled  Is God Limited? repeatedly
charged the scholastic tradition with limiting God inappropriately by imposing on God abstract
metaphysical principles. A model of God accepting such “self-limits” as restricting omnipotence
and omniscience—in the interest of responsive interaction with humanity—was championed in
contrast as providing a greater richness and fullness in the divine life. In the midst of his
argument McConnell revealed that he had been a student of McCabe in college and was
sympathetic with McCabe’s philosophical critique of divine prescience.77 However he based his
own arguments more on the importance of defining the divine attributes in a way that is faithful
to the revelation of God given in Christ.78 In keeping with this emphasis he strongly defended the
legitimacy of assigning “feelings” to God, including the ability for God to “suffer.” He even
showed some willingness to talk of God as open to growth or development, as long as it was
clear that this is in areas other than God’s basic moral nature.79
80See the evaluation of the influences on and agenda of Brightman’s works in Rufus Burrow Jr.,
Personalism: A Critical Introduction (St. Louis: Chalice, 1999), 160–64; and John H. Lavely, “Edgar
Sheffield Brightman: Good-and-Evil and the Finite-Infinite God,” in The Boston Personalist Tradition in
Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, edited by Paul Deats and Carol Robb (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1986), 121–46.
81See the progressive development of this notion in Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of
God (New York: Abingdon, 1930); The Finding of God (New York: Abingdon, 1931), esp. 115–93; A
Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), 305–41; and Person and Reality: An
Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), 323–42.
141
The advocacy of a limited God was taken up by Edgar Sheffield Brightman, probably the
most prominent of the Boston Personalists. While the theme was the same, Brightman’s focal
agenda differed significantly from McConnell. What challenged the traditional conception of
God for him were the findings of modern science and the problem of suffering (such as his
wife’s painful death from cancer), not its lack of fit with scripture or spirituality.80 He was
ultimately less concerned with defending God’s response-ability in relating to humanity than
with insulating God from responsibility for natural evil. This led him to propose that God is
actually finite—being eternally confronted by a “Given” which is not self-imposed (God did not
create it), and which can never be wholly eliminated even if it can be increasingly subdued. It is
this Given which is responsible for evils; God is responsible for challenging them and enabling
us to do so as well.81
While most of his colleagues and students were less than comfortable with his notion of
the Given, Brightman ensconced firmly within Boston Personalism an appreciation for a God
who is truly temporal, and can “grow” in some sense. Brightman was aware of parallels between
these themes and the emerging metaphysical system of Whitehead. Others would soon turn to
this system as a preferred metaphysical framework for their Methodist-honed convictions.
Conclusion: A Characteristically Wesleyan Concern about Classic Process Theology?
This essay has focused on one trajectory in the Wesleyan theological tradition that
cultivated a receptivity to the themes and concerns of process theology. There are surely others
that played a role. Likewise, there are several areas where one could identify points of
82See, for example, Michael L. Peterson, “Orthodox Christianity, Wesleyanism, and Process
Theology,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 15.2 (1980): 45–58.
83E.g., Tyron Inbody, The Transforming God: An Interpretation of Suffering and Evil (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 1997).
84Cf. Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free will Theists, edited
by John B. Cobb Jr. and Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
85A good example is Alan Padgett (see note 45 above).
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tension between characteristically Wesleyan theological emphases and the emphases of classic
process theology. I will close by noting the area most continuous with the history we have been
tracing.
While the longstanding Wesleyan commitment to God’s response-ability resonates
strongly with the process emphasis on God’s temporal, creative, and persuasive nature, it should
be no surprise that this same commitment renders many Wesleyans less happy with the apparent
restriction of God’s role in the ongoing process of the whole of reality to only that of “lure.”82 Is
such a God still truly response-able? Where is the basis for solid eschatological hope within this
restriction? Is there not a place for the wise God to engage us more actively than this, without
resorting to coercion?
Some contemporary Wesleyans are convinced that adequate answers to questions like
these can be provided by clarifying and nuancing process theology.83 Others believe that an
“adequate” model of a truly temporal God requires more significant revising of classic process
metaphysics.84 And still others are inclined to elaborate and reaffirm mediating positions like
those worked out by Watson or Pope.85  For Wesley, the deciding criterion would be which
approach best captures the balance of the biblical God—a God who works “strongly and
sweetly.”
